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May )d., 1969 
STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MONTANA) 
ABM 
The debate on the Safeguard ABM that has occurred to date and the 
testimonv that has been given have resulted in a conflict and not a consensus 
of views. No confluence of opinion has developed, no winnowing process has 
vet clearly divided the convincing from the confusing. As far as the techni-
cal merits of the Safeguard system are concerned we do not vet have t he l ucid 
guidelines we need for a prudent jndgment. 
To be sure , there has been a consensuE of sorts. There is virt ual 
unanimity, for example, that an ABM sys t em for t he protection of ci t ies would 
not be much good against an all-out nuclear attack and there is substantial 
agreement that regardless of what decision is made with respect to deplovment, 
research and development of anti-missile defenses should continue. 
The differences over the technical efficacy of Safeguard consti-
tute, however, only one segment of the problem. More significant is whether 
our deplo~rment of Safeguard will upset international stability , whether it 
will provoke an escalation in t he arms race, and whether it will assis t or 
handicap proposed negotiations with tbeSoviet Union on strategic delivery 
vehicles. 
One of the critical questions for which we s eek an answer is: 
Will the deployment of t he Safeguard provoke anot her round in the arms race? 
Will it be escalatory? It has become virt ually a t ruism that arms races a r e 
dangerous and can l ead to war . It is even more significant t hat they can be 
very costly in terms of national resources and that , despite ~he cost, after 
each upward spiral is t urned by the competitors in t he race , the security of 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 44, Folder 75, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
- 2 -
none is any greater. All too frequently, the rivals continue to balance each 
other, only at a more heavily armed and more expensive level. Arms racing, 
in short, can be an extravagant futility for all concerned. 
The United States admittedly has at times been a victim of the 
temptation to dissipate its resources in arms racing. The "bomber gap" of 
the fifties and the "missile gap" of the early sixties are well known instances 
in which the United States reacted to what were thought to be weapons advances 
on the other side but which later did not materialize. The Soviet government, 
too, has frequently reacted by expansions of its strategic weapons with the 
aim of matching or even outrunning the United States. There is no evidence 
that the action-reaction syndrome has been purged from the psychology of 
either the United States or the Soviet Union. A provocative weapons advance 
on either side today can be expected to trigger very much the same kind of 
counter-reaction as it did five, ten or fifteen years ago. 
Yet we slowly learn. One of the more encouraging aspects of the 
current Safeguard proposal is the conscious effort of American defense offi-
cials to devise a weapons system that is intended to be non-provocative and 
non-escalatory. The President, the Secretary of Defense and other officials 
have portrayed the installation of the Safeguard as a defensive not an offen-
sive measure and have concluded, as the President has said, that "the Soviet 
Union cannot interpret this as esca:J£ting the arms race." Unfortunately , the 
conclusion does not necessarily derive from t he premise. 
Distinctions between so-called "offensive" and "defensive" weapons 
are often semantic, not real. During negotiations in the League of Nations 
in the 1920's and 30's the attempt to distinguish between such weapons was 
a failure, one which contributed importantly to the stillbirth of those 
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negotiations. Although "defensive," the Safegtard system is designed to 
protect and preserve an "offensive" weapon. How the Soviet government chooses 
to react may hinge very little on whether it perceives the Safeguard system 
as "defensive" or "offensive" in a strictly military sense. The fact is it 
is another weapons svstem which has an impact on over-all strategic and poli-
tical relations. The Soviet Union ma~r well conclude that it has to compensate 
for this American initiative, not so much because of military logic but because 
of broader political imperatives. All of our experience with the international 
interaction between national military establishments leads to the conclusion 
that we cannot be dogmatic in asserting that the Safeguard will not have an 
escalatory effect. Indeed if we are calculating prudently, then we must anti-
cipate the opposite. If it does, then, it could seriously prejudice endeavors 
to arrive at an understanding with the Soviet government on limiting strategic 
armaments. 
There is also a serious question whether the Soviet government mav 
not be engaged in a weapons deployment that could gravely prejudice the possi-
bility of negotiating an agreement on strategic armaments. I refer to its 
deployment of the SS -9, an ICBM with a warhead reported to be as large as 
20 to 25 megatons. The Secretary of Defense has sought to justify the Safe-
guard proposal on the grounds that the SS -9 deployment indicates the Soviet 
Union is striving for a first-strike capabilitv against the United States. 
A certain portion of the Minuteman force must be safeguarded, he argues, in 
order to insure its survival and to maintain our capability for assured 
destruction against the Soviet Union. 
I do not intend to take issue with the principle of assured destruc-
tion as the core of national deterrent policy. Nor, if the alleged Soviet 
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threat is valid, do I necessarily quarrel with the thesis that it may be 
desirable to defend a portion of our offensive strike force in order to make 
certain we retain a capability of assured destruction. But the suddenness 
with which the threat of the SS-9 has been conjured up necessitates a close 
examination. 
It is disconcerting that Mr. Laird's disclosures come close on the 
heels of another Department of Defense appraisal of the national strategic 
posturethat was formulated in entirely different terms. It is disturbing 
that one Secretary of Defense can communicate to the Congress one intelli-
gence conclusion regarding the Soviet Union and another Secretary of Defense 
only two months later, presumably relying upon the same data, the same intelli-
gence organization, and the same estimate, can arrive at a substantially 
different conclusion. 
The last posture statement of Secretary Clark Clifford, which 
appeared in mid-January of this year, declares that "even against the 
highest Soviet threat" projected in the National Int elligence Estimate , the 
U. S. strategic forces programmed over the next few years could destroy in 
a second strike more than two-fifths of the Soviet population and about three-
fourths of their industrial capacity. This, the Secretary confirmed, was 
sufficient assured destruction capability to comprise an adequate deterrent. 
The Secretary warned, hov1ever, tha-,., we must be prepared t o cope 
with unexpected developments in the Soviet strategic threat and take appro-
priate actions to hedge against them. One of the unexpected contingencies 
foreseen by the Secretary was the possibility of development of a Soviet 
ICBM with target kill capability that would be able to destroy a large munber 
of U. S. land-based missiles in hard silos. But he saw no need to take 
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countermeasures against this possibilitv until there was evidence that the 
threat was beginning to emerge. Yet in March, Secretary Laird perceived 
such a threat and decided t o revamp the Sentinel system not only by changing 
the object of its defense from the cities to Minuteman, but also by placing 
the emphasis on the Soviet Union, rather than Communist China, as the princi-
pal adversary. The villain responsible for this switch in scripts was the 
SS-9 which was described as being deployed at a menacing rate. 
But the SS-9 is nothing new. Its existence has been known for 
some years and its increasing deployment has been observed. Did some new 
element suddenly stimulate t he fears of the Defense Secretary? He mentioned 
evidence as recent as last December of Soviet deployment of the SS -9. But 
are we to believe that Secretary Clifford's assessment in January was not 
made with full awareness of the SS-9 deployment and its potential? If the 
Defense Department in January deemed t hat the Soviet deployment of SS -9's 
implied such a formidable threat to our offensive missiles, if they considered 
it a first-strike force, why did not Secretanr Clifford's statement reflect 
that judgment? lfTas some radically new intelligence gained between January 
and March? Was a new estimate rnade bv the intelligence cormnunity which 
dramatically enlarged the Soviet threat in those two intervening months? 
I do not find in Secretary Laird's public utterances claims of either signi-
fant new data or a new National Intelligence Estimate. 
Since his first disclosure of the threat of the SS-9, the Defense 
Secretary has asserted he referred only to a Soviet capability and not to 
an intention. Moreover, the Secretary of State has disclaimed a belief that 
the Soviet government intends a first strike against the Uni ·~ed States. In 
any case the Defense Secretary is not referring to a Soviet first-strike 
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capability that exists now but only to one which might exist in the mid-
1970's, assuming that present trends of deployment continue over a period 
of years. He has in a word assumed just about the worst possible projection 
of Soviet deployment and, then, has reacted as though it were certain to 
become a reality. 
But we have seen these projections of Soviet capabilities go a•rry 
all too many times. Too many times before we have over-reacted to a theo-
retical projection which never became a tangible fact. I haveaready cited 
the vell-known bomber and missile gaps. I would also like to point out that 
when the Sentinel ABM system was proposed in 1967 it was predicated on pro-
jections of Chinese and Soviet deployments which did not materialize. It 
According to Secreta0r Laird, 
was then estimated that theSoviet ICBM deployment would level off. /it did 
not. But now the Safeguard proposal is predicated on the assumption that it 
will continue. But what if it levels off? 
There are many reasons to expect that it mi ght. According to 
Under Secretary of Defense Packard the Soviet ICBM force has attained "parity" 
with our own, and it is reasonable to suppose that the Soviet Union might 
have sought this level as a precondition for negotiations on a strategic 
arms agreement with the United States. It would not be realistic on our 
part to expect they would a gree to freeze armaments at less than parity. 
And they are not so unrealis t ic as to dream that we would accept a ratio 
that was unbalanced in their favor. 
Both we and they should grasp and ponder the fact that we are at 
a decisive milestone . A state of approximate strategic balance now obtains 
bet ween the two sides. Each has sufficiency of strategic power to deter 
the other. If at this critical moment either tries to gain an advantage by 
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introducing new strategic systems or by substantially enlarging existing 
deployments, then the present stability could be upset. And there would 
be no prospect that it could be regained, at least not until another major 
round in the arms race had been completed, perhaps years hence and at dire 
economic , social and political costs. 
The i~~ediate manifestation of the deployment or non-deployment 
of Safeguard will be its possible effects upon the long -pending negotiations 
on strategic delivery vehicles. I fear that the Safeguard proposal has 
already had a baleful effect upon the decision to s t art these parleys. The 
major survey of defense policv which the new Administration apparentl~, is 
now conducting seems to have become an obstacle to the diplomacy of "non-
confrontation and negotiation" which President Nixon established as the 
main thrust of his Administration 's foreign policy. "Late spring or early 
surnmer"--the announced time for beginning the talks --is a vague deadline 
which contrasts sharply with the trrgency of the hard sell to win approval 
of appropriations for the Safeguard ABM in the fiscal year beginning Jul:'l 1. 
The enthusiasm for building the weapon compares starkly with the dawdling 
pace of the preparat ions alleged to be necessary for United States entrv 
into the talks. Actually preparations for strategic talks have been underway 
for several years--the United States first made the proposal for freezing 
strategic delivery vehicles in January 1964, and was ready t o start negotiat-
ing in the summer of last year. '\fu;r should it be necessary to pull everything 
up by the roots again just to see if it is alive and well? Let us get on 
with the talks. Let us set a date--a date in early June. This will dispel 
suspicion that the United States is reluctant to undertake these talks and 
is orf.! i 11 favor of expanding than constricting the arms race. 
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On April 25, I inserted in the Congressional Record a chart compar-
ing the relative nuclear strength between the United States and the Soviet 
Union. Shown rather p;raphically is the growth rate that has maintained this 
balance of nuclear terror; it is an ugly picture that has not changed signi -
ficantly for vears. In the same insertion, I suggested that in view of the 
questions raised about the feasibility of t he system, its exorbitant costs, 
etc., rather than begin the Safeguard deployment even in a limited fashion 
it would be a better course at this time to hold off this phase pending a 
good faith effort to open disarmament talks with the Soviet Union. At the 
same time I said our missile defense research and development efforts could 
go forward, thereby keeping viable the option to begin a deployment if and 
when it is clear that talks will not be productive and that the Safeguard 
system is technologically feasible. 
The need now, it seems to me, is to move promptly on negotiations 
and to try to maximize the chances for their success. To t hat end, it might 
be helpful if talks were be~un bv the Soviet and the United States with 
simultaneous declarations calling for an int erim moratorium on fur t her 
deployment of all strategic weapons. It would be my hope that this nation 
would consider taking the ini t iative by inviting the Soviet Union to join us 
without delay in a temporary freeze of this kind pending t alks 1vhich 1wuld be 
desif ned to make the freeze permanent. In tha t fashion both nations would 
underscore the mutuality of interest which can exist--which, in fact, does 
exist--in bringing to a close this costly, wasteful and futile competi t ion 
in nuclear armament s. It would be my f ur t her hope that the initiat ive which 
is suggested would be pursued by the Executive Branch before t he consideration 
of the Safeguard deployment reaches a point of no r eturn in the Senate . 





PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THB 9 I C<?NGRESS, FIRST SESSION 
Vol. 115 WASHINGTON, TUESDAY, MAY 13, 1969 No. 77 
The Senate met at 11:30 a.m., and was 
called to order by the President pro 
tempore. 
The Chapla.ln, the Reverend Edward L. 
R . Elson, DD., otrered the following 
prayer: 
Trust in the Lord with all thine heart; 
and lean not upon thine own understand-
ing. Proverbs 3: 5. 
Almighty 000. we thank Thee this day 
that Thou hast gathered our people into 
a great nation and established their free-
dom under Thy sovereignty, Let not our 
goodly heritage fade or the bright vision 
of service to all mankind be disowned. 
Deepen the root of our life in everlasting 
righteousness. Make us equal to our high 
trust; reverent in the use of freedom; 
just in the exercise of power; generous in 
the protection of the weak. May wisdom 
and ·morality be the stability of our 
times; and our deepest trust be in Thee, 
Lord of the nations and King of Kings. 
Amen. 
ORDER OF BUSINESS 
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under 
the order of yesterday, the Chair recog-
nizes the distinguished maJority leader, 
the Senator from Montana <Mr. MANs-
I'DILDl, for not exceeding 20 minutes. 
The Senator from Montana.. 
THE JOURNAL 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask 
unanimous consent tha.t the reading of 
the Journal of the proceedings of Mon-
day, May 12, 1969, be dispensed with. 
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. With-
out objection, it is so ordered. 
COMMITTEE MEETINGS DURING 
SENATE SESSION 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask 
unanimous consent that all committees 
be authorized to meet dur 1g the session 
of the Senate today. 
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. With-
out objection, it is so ordered. 
ABM 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the 
debate on the Safeguard ABM that has 
occurred to date and the testimony that 
Senate 
has been given have resulted in a con-
flict and not a consensus of views. No 
confluence of opinion has developed, no 
winnowing process has yet clearly divided 
the convincing from the confusing. As 
far as the technical merits of the Safe-
guard sl'stem are concerned, we do not 
yet have the lucid guidelines we need for 
a. prudent judgment. 
To be sure, there has been a consensus 
of sorts. There is virtual unaninUty, for 
example, that an ABM system for the 
protection of cities would not be much 
good against an all-out nuclear attack 
and there is substantial agreement that, 
regardless of what decision is made with 
respect to deployment, research and de-
velopment of antlmissUe de!enses should 
continue. 
The dltrerences over the technical effi-
cacy of Safeguard constitute, however, 
only one segment of the problem. More 
significant is whether our deployment of 
Safeguard w111 upset international sta-
bility, whether it w111 provoke an escala-
tion in the arms race, and whether It will 
assist or handicap proposed negotiations 
with the Soviet Union on strategic de-
livery vehicles. 
One of the critical questions for which 
we seek an answer is: Wlli the deploy-
ment of the Safeguard provoke another 
round in the arms race? Wlli It be 
escalatory? It has become virtually a 
truism that arms races are dangerous and 
can lead to war. It is even more 
significant that they can be very costly in 
terms of national resources and that, 
despite the cost, after each upward spiral 
is turned by the competitors in the race, 
the security of none is any greater. All too 
frequently, the rivals continue to bal-
ance each other, only at a more heavily 
armoo and more expensive level. Arms 
racing, in short, can be an extravagant 
futility for all concerned. 
The United States admittedly has at 
times been a victim of the temptation to 
dissipate !Ls resources in arms racing. 
The "bomber gap" of the fifties and the 
"missile gap" of the early sixties are well-
known instances in which the United 
States reacted to what were thought to be 
weapons advances on the other side but 
which later did not materialize. The 
Soviet Government, too, has frequently 
re~ted by expansions of its strategic 
weapons with the aim of matching or 
even outrunhlng the United States. There 
is no evidence that the action-reaction 
syndrome has been purged from the 
psychology of either the United States or 
the Soviet Union. A provocative weapons 
advance on either side today can be ex-
pected to trigger very much the same kind 
of counterreact!on as it did 5, 10, or 15 
years ago. 
Yet we slowly learn. One of the more 
encouraging aspects of the current Safe-
guard proposal is the conscious etrort of 
American defense officials to devise a 
weapons system that is intended to be 
nonprovocatlve and nonescalatory. The 
President, the Secretary of Defense, and 
other officials have portrayed the instal-
lation of the Safeguard as a defensive, 
not an offensive, measure and have con-
cluded, as the President has said, that 
"the Soviet Union cannot interoret this as 
escalating the arms race." Unfortunately, 
the conclusion does not necessarily derive 
from the premise. 
Distinctions between so-called "otren-
s1ve" and "defensive" weapons are often 
semantic, not real. During negotiations 
in the League of Nations in the 1920's and 
1930's the attempt to distinguish between 
such weapons was a failure, one which 
contributed importantly to the stlllb!rth 
of those negotiations. Although "defen-
sive," the Safeguard system is designed 
to protect and preserve 'an "otrensive" 
weapon. How the Soviet Government 
chooses to react may hinge very little on 
whether it perceives the Safeguard sys-
tem as "defensive" or "otrensive" in a 
strictly military sense. The fact is it is an-
other weapons system which has an Im-
pact on overall strategic and political re-
lations. The Soviet Union may well con-
clude that it has to compensate for this 
American initiative, not so much because 
of military logic but because of broader 
political imperatives. All of our experi-
ence with the international interaction 
between national mllltary establishments 
leads to the conclusion that we cannot be 
dogmatic in assertin~ that the Safeguard 
w111 not have an escalatory effect. Indeed, 
if we are calculating prudently, then we 
must anticipate the opposite. If it does, 
then, Jt could seriously prejudice endeav-
ors to arrive at an understanding with 
the Soviet Government on limiting stra-
tegic armaments. 
There is also a serious question whether 
the Soviet Government may not be en-
S 5043 
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gaged in a weapons deployment that 
could gravely prejudice the possibility of 
negotiating an agreement on st rategic 
armaments. I refer to Its deployment of 
the SS-9, an ICBM with a warhead re-
ported to be as large as 20 to 25 megatons. 
The Secretary of Defense has sought to 
justify the Safeguard proposal on the 
grounds that the SS-9 deployment indi-
cates the Soviet Union is striving for a 
first-strike capability against the United 
States. A certain portion of the Minute-
man force must be safeguarded, he ar-
gues, in order to insure its survival and to 
maintain our capability for assured de-
struction against the Soviet Union. 
I do not intend to take issue with the 
principle of assured destruction as the 
core of national deterrent policy. Nor, 1f 
the alleged Soviet threat is valid, do I 
necessarily quar rel with the thesis that 
it may be desirable to defend a portion of 
our o:!Iensive strike force in order to make 
certain we retain a capability of assured 
destruction. But t he 'Suddenness with 
which the threat of the SS-9 has been 
conjured up necessitates a close exami-
nation. 
It is disconcerting that Mr. Laird's dis-
closures come close on the heels of an-
other Department of Defense appraisal 
of the national strategic posture that was 
formulated in entirely different terms. It 
is disturbing that one Secretary of De-
fense can communicate to the Congress 
one in telligence conclusion regarding the 
SOviet Union and another Secretary of 
Defense, only 2 months later, presumably 
relying upon t he same data, the same 
intelligence organization, and the same 
estimate, can arrive at a substantially 
di.tferent conclusion. 
The last posture statement of Secre-
tary Cla rk Clitford, which appeared in 
mJd-January of this year, declares that 
"even against the highest Soviet threat" 
projected in the national intelligence 
estima te, the U.S . strategic forces pro-
gramed over the n ext few years could 
destroy in a second strike more than two-
fifths of the Soviet population and. about 
three-fourths of their industrial capac-
Ity. This, the Secrelalry confirmed, was 
sufficient assured destruction capability 
to comprise an adequate deterrent. 
The Secreta ry warned, however, that 
we must be prepared to cope with unex-
pected developments in the Soviet stra-
tegic threat and take appropriate actions 
to hedge against them. One of the unex-
pected contingencies foreseen by the Sec-
retary was the possibility of development 
of a Soviet ICBM with a target kill ca-
pability that would be able to destroy a 
large number of U.S. land-based missiles 
in hard silos. But he saw no need to take 
countermeasures against this possibilit~ 
until there was evidenc that the threat 
was beginning to emerge. Yet in March, 
Secretary Laird perceived such a threat 
and decided to revamp the Sentinel sys-
tem not only by changing the object of 
its defense from the cities to Minuteman , 
but also by placing the emphasis on the 
Soviet Union, rather than CommUnist 
China, as the prin cipal adversary. The 
villain responsible for this switch 1n 
scripts was the SS-9 which wa.~ described 
as being deployed at a menadng rate. 
But the 88-9 is nothing new. Its ex-
istence has been known for some years 
and its increasing deployment has been 
observed. Did some new element ;;ud-
denly stimulate the fears of the Defense 
Secretary? He mentioned evidence as re-
cent as last December of Soviet deploy-
ment of the SS-9. But are we to believe 
that Secretary Clifford's assessment in 
January was not made with full aware-
ness of the 88-9 deployment and its po-
tential? If the Defense Department in 
January deemed that the Soviet deploy-
ment of 8S-9's implied s1:1ch a formidable 
threat to our offensive missiles, if they 
considered it a first-strike force, why did 
not Secretary Clifford's statement reflect 
that judgment? Was some radically new 
intelligence gained between January and 
March? Was a new estimate made by the 
intelligence community which dramatic-
ally enlarged the Soviet threat in those 
two intervening months? I do not find 
in Secretary Laird's public utterances 
claims of either significant new data or a 
new national intelligence estimate. 
Slnce his first disclosure of the threat 
of the SS-9, the Defense Secretary has 
asserted he referred only to a Soviet ca-
pability and not to an intention. More-
over, the Secretary of State has dis-
claimed a belief that the Soviet Govern-
ment Intends a first strike against the 
United States. In any case the Defense 
Secretary is not referring to a Soviet 
first-strike capability that exists now but 
only to one which might exist 1n the mid-
1970's, assuming that present trends of 
deployment continue over a period of 
years. He has, in a word, assumed just 
about the worst possible projection of 
Soviet deployment, and then has reacted 
as though it were certain to become a 
reality. 
But we have seen these projections of 
Soviet capabilities go awry all too many 
times. Too many times before we have 
overreacted to a theoretical projection 
which never became a tangible fact. I 
have already cited the well-known 
bomber and missile gaps. I would also 
like to point out that when the Sentinel 
ABM system was proposed in 1967, it was 
predicated on projections of Chinese and 
Soviet deployments which did not materi-
alize. It was then estimated that the 
Soviet ICBM deployment would level off. 
According to Secretary Laird, It did not. 
But now the Safeguard proposal is predi-
cated on the assumption that it will con-
tinue. But what if it levels off? 
There are many reasons to expect that 
It might. According to Under Secretary 
of Defense Packard the Soviet ICBM 
force has attained "parity" with our 
own, and it is reasonable to suppose that 
the Soviet Union might have sought this 
level as a precondition for negotiations 
on a strategic arms agreement with the 
United States. It would not be realistic on 
our part to expect they would agree to 
freeze armaments at less than parity. 
And they are not so unrealistic as to 
dream that we would accept a ratio that 
was unbalanced in their favor. 
Both we and they shoulp grasp and 
ponder the fact that we are at a decisive 
m!lestone. A state of approximate stra-
tegic balance now obtains between the 
two sides. Each has sufficiency of stra-
tegic power to deter the other. If at this 
critical moment either tries to gain an 
advantage by introducing new strategic 
systems or by substantially enlarging ex-
isting deployments, then the presen t sta-
bility could be upset. And there would 
be no prospect that It could be regained, 
at least not untll another major round 
1n the arms race had been completed, 
perhaps years hence and at dire eco-
nomic, social, and political costs. 
The immediate manifestation of the 
deployment or nondeployment of Safe-
guard w111 be its possible effects upon the 
long-pending negotiations on strategic 
delivery vehicles. I fear that the Safe-
guard proposal has already had a baleful 
effect upon the decision to start these 
parleys. The major survey of defense 
policy which the new administration ap-
parently is now conducting seems to have 
become an obstacle to the diplomacy of 
"nonconfrontation and negotiation" 
which President Nixon established as the 
main thrust of his administration's for-
eign policy. "Late spring or early sum-
mer"-the announced time for beginning 
the talks--is a vague deadline which 
contrasts sharply with the urgency of 
the hard sell to win approval of appro-
priations for the Safeguard ABM in the 
fiscal year beginningg July 1. The enthu-
siasms for building the weapon compares 
starkly with the dawdling paee of t he 
preparations alleged to be necessary for 
U.S. entry Into the talks. Actually prep-
arations for strategic talks h ave been 
underway for several years--the United 
States first made the proposal for freez-
ing strategic delivery vehicles 1n Janu-
ary 1964, and was ready to start negoti-
ating In the summer of last year. Why 
should it be necessary to pull everything 
up by the roots again just to see if 1t Is 
alive and well? Let us get on with the 
talks. Let us set a date-a date in early 
June. This will dispel suspicion that the 
United States Is reluctant to undertake 
these talks and is more 1n favor of ex-
panding than constricting the arms 
race. 
On April 25, I inserted in the CoN-
GRESSIONAL RECORD a chart comparing 
the relative nuclear strength between 
the United States and the Soviet Union . 
Shown rather graphically is the growth 
rate that has maintained this balance 
of nuclear terror; it is an ugly picture 
that has not changed· significantly for 
years. In the same insertion, I suggested 
that in view of the questions raised about 
the fea.sibility of the system, its exorbi-
tant costs, reliability, and so forth , 
rather than begin the Safeguard deploy-
ment even in a limit.ed fashion it would 
be a better course at this time to hold off 
this phase pending a good-faith effort to 
open disarmament tall<._s with the Soviet 
Union. At the same time I said our missile 
defense research and development efforts 
could go forward, thereby keeping viable 
the option to begin a deployment if 
and when it is clear that talks will not 
be productive and that the Safeguard 
system is technologically feasible. 
The need now, it seems to me, is to 
~ove promptly on negotiations and to 
try to maximize the chances for their 
success. To that end, it might be helpful 
If talks were begw1 .by the Soviet Union 
and the United States, wi"th simultaneous 
declarations calling for an itnerim mor-
atorium on further deployment of all 
str.a~_£ ~ons. It would be my hope 
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that this Nation would consider taking 
the initiative by inviting the Soviet Un-
ion to join us without delay in a tem-
porary freeze of this kind pending talks 
which would be designed to make the 
freeze permanent. In that fashion both 
n::Jtions would underscore the mutuality 
of interest which can exist--which, in 
fact, does exist-in bringing to a close 
this costly, wasteful, and futile compe-
tition in nuclear armaments. It would 
by my further hope that the initiative, 
which is suggested, would be pw-sued by 
the executive branch before the consid-
eration of the Safeguard deployment 
reaches a point of no return in the Sen-
ate. 
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, the ma-
jority leader, the distinguished senator 
from Montana, has given us a statement 
on the implications that deployment of 
an anti-ballistic-missile system at this 
time would have for this country. He has 
struck at the key issues with clarity and 
wisdom. 
Underneath the technical complexity 
and difficult judgments about missile 
technology lies a simple truth. It is this-
we are at a moment in time, the first 
time in the quarter of a century of the 
nuclear age, where it may be possible to 
halt the nuclear arms race with all the 
danger it holds for all our people and 
for the world. Already, we are informed, 
the equivalent in nuclear power of more 
than 15 tons of TNT hovers over the 
head of every man, woman, and child 
on the earth. 
·We who oppose deployment of the 
M3M at this time are asking for a brief 
delay in the arms race during which the 
United States can enter into negotiations 
with the Soviet Union to determine 
whetner it is possible-either by formal 
or tacit agreement-to halt the arms 
race, or whether it is necessary to go 
on as in the past, piling up more and 
more deadly nuclear weapons. 
The United States can defer deploy-
ment of the ABM for three principal rea-
sons: 
First. It presently has an overwhelm-
ing retaliatory capability-an ability to 
destroy the Soviet Union. This capability 
can be maintained eYen if the Soviet Un-
ion continues the development of nu-
clear weapons at its maximum capacity 
through the mid-1970's. 
Second. A reasonable analysis ·of the 
intelligence available is that there is no 
new or present danger to ow- deterrent. 
Third. The ABM system proposed by 
the administration, is the subject of so 
much responsible doubt about its feasi-
bility for mlssile site protection that a 
delay of d eployment would ~erve the Na-
tion well. The most efir,dive strategic 
response to a real threat Lo our deterrent 
could be developed in the time our Gov-
ernment is seeking a halt in the nuclear 
arms race, rather than in haste to build 
and deploy an ineffective system. 
In conclusion, it is my hope that the 
administration will heed the wise words 
of the majority leader. There is no de-
sire of those opposed to the ABM deploy-
ment to confront the administration po-
litically. Reasonable solutions are still 
possible. The United States can enter 
into negotiations with the Soviet Union 
with confidence in its existing and pre-
ponderant strength. The United States 
can do so with the knowledge that if ne~ 
gotiations fail, we havP the resources and 
time to do what is necessary to insure 
the credibility of our deterrent and awe-
some, if uncertain, security. 
It is my view that delay can be taken 
in safety. It is my view that a brief de-
lay to determine if a halt in the nuclear 
weapons race is possible is the course of 
reason, the course of responsibility, and 
the duty of a great country. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I 
commend the distinguished Senator from 
Kentucky for the brief statement he has 
just made. He has said more in a few 
words than I said in many. He has stated 
the case better and more succinctly. I 
join with him in the postulate that this 
is not a political matter, that this is 
something in which we are all vitally 
interested regardless of politics, and tLat 
those of us who oppose the system do 
not doubt the honesty and integrity of 
those who are in favor of it. 
e is a matter of judgment which must 
be faced up to and on which a decision 
must be made. I join the Senator from 
Kentucky in saying that we ought to 
undertake to start negotiations if it is 
at all possible, and that they ought to 
be undertaken in good faith. If results 
are not forthcoming and good faith is 
not displayed, then we ought to get busy 
and enlarge the de' errent. 
I do not believe that a delay would 
cause any difficulty. I think it would 
yield much good. If an agreement to halt 
arms race can be brought about through 
the two superpowers, it would mean that 
in this country we would be able to 
divert funds to the needs of the cities 
and to the needs of various segments of 
aur population which must be met and 
faced up to. In that way we shall bring 
about a balance in our sense of respon-
sibilities, which in the long run will re• 
act to the welfare of this Nation as a 
whole. 
I again commend the distinguished 
senior Senator from Kentucky, who has 
taken the leadership in this matter over 
several years and who has done a lot 
of good groundwork to bolster the case 
he has presented on occasion to the 
Senate. 
I assure the Senator once again that 
this is not a political matter. It is not 
a matter of a gain or loss for either the 
Republican or Democratic Party. It 1s 
a matter in the best interest of the 
country. Regardless of its effect on either 
party or on any candidate, it is the is-
sue which should have priority at all 
times. 
Let us at least make an effort. Let us 
go ahead and see if we cannot do some-
thing which would benefit mankind; In-
stead of continually building and bulld-
ing and acting and reacting with missiles 
and other systems, which can do nothing 
but bring destruction on mankind as a 
whole. 
We have a great responsibility ln the 
Senate. Let us face up to it and build for 
peace and not for disaster; or at least 
Jet us try to move toward the elimina-
tion of that which Is designed to destroy 
people. 
S5045 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 44, Folder 75, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
